日本军事专家针对中国长江铁路桥的打击行动构

作者: 澳门新葡亰手机娱乐网址  发布:2019-11-03

针对美国核力量长期缺乏资金和相关支持,以及部队内部士气低落、人员短缺、管理不善等情况,2014年11月15日,国防部部长哈格尔在加州里根总统图书馆召开的里根国防论坛上,宣布将全面改革美国核力量,旨在对国核威慑力量进行彻底整顿。一、美国国防部再度对核力量进行审查美国核力量存在的问题自2013年下半年以来,有关美国核力量的负面消息不时见诸新闻媒体:8月,一“民兵-3”洲际弹道导弹发射中队未能通过安全检查;10月,掌管空军全部450枚“民兵-3”导弹的第20航空队指挥官迈克尔·凯里少将因在7月访俄期间“行为举止不当”而被解除职务;2014年1月,装备“民兵-3”导弹的第341导弹联队34名士兵因在核弹操作考试中集体作弊被通报;等等。针对这一系列事件,2014年2月,美国前国防部长哈格尔下令对核力量进行一次全面的内部审查和外部审查。内部审查由现役高官负责;外部审查由退役将领牵头。审查主要通过参观核基地及其重点配套设施和采访军官、士兵、非现役文职人员、承包商等方式进行。11月14日,哈格尔宣布了审查结果及拟采取的整改措施。审查得出的结论是:核力量目前的结构不连贯,因而得不到恰当的管理。为此,美国国防部制定了包括提高指挥官级别、赋予指挥官更多权力、增加资金投入在内的100多项改进措施。这是十年内美国国防部对核力量进行的第二次全面审查。上一次审查是在2008年,其采取的最重要、也是规模最大的一项措施是重新整合空军战略核力量,新建空军全球打击司令部。未来核力量重振计划哈格尔的核力量全面改革计划,包括推动多项改革以提升老化的核武设施。该计划涉及空军和海军两种军种,计划在未来五年内增加对核力量投资75亿美元,每年递增10%左右。2016年核力量预算额介于150~160亿美元之间,这些数据不含国家核安全局对于核武库投资。在空军方面,下一任空军全球打击司令部司令将会提升到上将军衔,下一任负责核威慑的空军助理参谋长将会提升到中将军衔,人员裁减计划不包括核力量编制,相反未来将要增加1000个岗位,被搁置的与核力量相关的UH-1N直升机替换项目推前到优先位置。在海军方面,其战略系统项目将增加2500个岗位。作为核力量改革计划中最重要的一项,五角大楼计划从2017年预算开始,把战略武器项目采办资金单立,采用导弹防御局的资金管理模式,而不再由海空军种自己掌握。二、从美国核力量审查中可解读出的信息美国2008年对核力量实施审查的“导火索”是接连发生的涉核事故,此次审查同样针对核力量管理中暴露出来的种种问题。这表明上次审查及其后的整改工作并未达到预期目的。缘何自20世纪90年代以来在历次局部战争和武装冲突中表现均十分出色的美军,在核力量管理方面却如此不堪呢?冷战后核力量地位作用大幅降低冷战结束后,美国昔日的核军备竞赛对手苏联核遗产的继承者俄罗斯内外交困、自顾不暇,加以其战略弹道导弹防御系统由于资金不足、体系被割裂等原因,实际上处于不能正常运转的状况,故而,尽管俄罗斯不断增强核力量,但实际上不可能主动发起对美国的核袭击。其他有核国家更是无力与美国实施核对抗了。因此,在2010年《核态势评估》中,美国明确核武器在安全战略中的“唯一作用”将是威慑别国不对美国及其盟友实施核打击。然而,在明显缺乏遭核袭前提的情况下,这个“唯一作用”确实难以突出显现。核力量审查、整顿治标不治本“美国科学家联盟”“核信息项目”负责人汉斯·M·克里斯腾森指出,一味地投入更多资金,赋予指挥官更高级别、更多权力的做法,仍改变不了弹道导弹核潜艇每年执行巡逻次数已大幅下降、“民兵-3”导弹始终以高戒备状态应对永远也不可能发生的核攻击的事实。克里斯腾森认为,对于已经超过美国安全及其国际承诺需要的核武库,国防部最应该做的是“缩减部队结构,降低现代化成本,并通过重组和节约成本来解决管理和人员的基本问题”。“否则,我敢断定,我们几年后还需要再次开展审查。”陆基战略核力量可能日渐萎缩冷战结束后,尤其是随着核威胁的减弱,美国国内围绕“三位一体”战略核力量同时存在的必要性一直存在较大争议。而首当其冲的则是“民兵-3”导弹,因为部署于发射井中的“民兵-3”导弹更容易受到剥夺能力的先发制人式的攻击。此次审查、整顿,皆源于“民兵-3”导弹部队出现的问题。不久前在五角大楼举行的记者会上,美国空军通报了6个基地共11名军官涉嫌吸毒和推销毒品的问题,但惟独属于第20航空队的3名军官被重点渲染。凡此种种,是否意味着美国将重点消减陆基战略核力量亦未为可知。强调战术核武器运用为应对即将到来的军备寒冬,美军界思谋重启动冷战时期用于平衡苏联优势地面装甲力量的战术核武器。美军为实现对华军事威慑,除在常规力量持续收缩的背景下向西太倾斜部署外,准备适时重新在该地区部署战术核武,作为针对中国军力增长的“平衡器”。美希望中国意识到,任何对美及其盟国的军事冒险都可能引发核战争,从而大幅提升常规军事冲突升级为美中核战的风险,使中国放弃军事冒险企图。而且目前在东亚部署战术核武也具备有利的客观环境,朝鲜核威胁及军事挑衅造成半岛局势紧张,日韩均希望美在东亚地区部署战术核武器,以强化美国的区域威慑能力。三、美国核力量审查对中国的启示美国对核力量审查、整顿所释放的信息,对中国核力量建设亦不乏有益启示。把握核力量建设的“度”面对崛起、复兴过程中存在的复杂周边环境,中国大力发展核力量,夯实国家安全盾牌,是非常必要的。但为展示负责任大国形象,这种发展应以美俄维持在《美苏中导条约》框架内,不延缓、阻断美俄限制战略武器进程,不刺激美国盟国因对“核保护伞”缺乏信心而执意发展核武器为基本着眼点。重点发展生存能力强的核力量考虑到现代侦察、打击手段性能状况,结合中国实际情况,在可预见的未来,中国应优先、重点发展陆基公路机动战略核力量,确保第二炮兵洲际导弹在任何时候都能“打得出”、“突得进”、“毁得了”,从而使敌国不敢轻举妄动,不敢不刻意控制战争规模。探寻适应核力量的管理之道客观而言,中国核力量在人事、训练、管理、投资等方面也存在与美国核力量同样或类似的问题,故而如何最大限度地避免业已发生在美国核力量中的问题在中国核力量中出现,需要探索具有中国特色的管理模式和管理方法,并采取切实有效的应对措施。加强对美军核力量运用的研究探讨美国战术核武器的运用原则和理论,特别是西太地缘战略背景下的常规武器与战术核武器、战术核武器与战略核武器的运用原则差别,对我未来军事斗争准备将更具现实意义。相关资料1、查克•哈格尔,“美国国防部”网站,《美国国防部长致核部队的一封信》(A Message to the Force on Our Nuclear Enterprise),2014年11月14日。网址参见 of DoD Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review),2014年11月14日。网址参见 Review To Fix Nuclear Problems – Again),2014年11月14日。网址参见 最后还是没过》,2014年1月16日。网址参见 数十名核弹控制官考试作弊》,2014年 12月 4日。网址参见

本文首发于Survival: Global Politics and Strategy杂志2013年6-7月刊,网址参见

日本《军事研究》2014年11月号刊登日本军事专家文谷数重题为《攻击长江铁路桥将中国南北分割》的文章。文章指出,为在战争爆发后终止战争,“美国应通过炸毁连接中国南北物流的长江上的铁路桥,使中国战时经济崩溃,从而瓦解中国的持续作战意志”。

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Chinese officials and analysts regard the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific as a strategy to contain China, despite Washington’s claim that it does not focus on a particular country. Instead of accepting either Chinese skepticism or US official statements at face value, this article attempts to trace the origins and examine the evolution of the pivot through the lens of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, the Office of Net Assessment .Drawing on documents produced and sponsored by the office, this article explores trends in its analysis of Asian security and Sino-American relations, the rationale for the pivot and China’s role in the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy.Established in 1973, the ONA is directed by Andrew W. Marshall and employs around 15 staff.1 Most of its projects are outsourced to external academics, think tanks and companies. The US Department of Defense defines net assessment as ‘the comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.’2 The ONA studies issues relevant to national security such as weapons technology and climate change, explores worst-case scenarios and promotes no-regret strategies. 3 Using methods such as war games, simulations, policy analysis and scenario-based planning, the office aims to anticipate strategic developments 20 years in advance.Marshall was described by former US Vice President Dick Cheney as one of the world’s best strategists, and last year was ranked at number 44 in Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers.4 Like many first-generation RAND scholars, Marshall is often praised for his originality, though he has also been criticised for making exaggerated claims.This article is based on the study of ONA-related defence department documents and memoranda, the writings of officials and experts associated with the office and work by individuals and organisations it commissioned to carry out research. For brevity, I will not specify every aspect of the ONA’s relationship with the individuals and organisations quoted in this article. Generally, these sources influenced, or were influenced by, Marshall and the ONA. Those associated with the ONA will usually be referred to as net assessors. Although Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999 seemingly has no connection to the office, Marshall and Albert Wohlstetter were consulted on the drafting of the document.5 Zalmay Khalilzad and Abram N. Shulsky, major authors of the guidance, both have a background at RAND and are closely associated with Marshall and Wohlstetter. Shulsky also worked for the ONA, and was one of the participants in its 1999 Summer Study. This article examines ONA-related work since the 1980s.I recognise the limitations of this approach. Firstly, there is no discussion of the degree to which US national-security policy has in fact been influenced by the office and the studies it sponsored. Secondly, some may categorise the ONA and its associated net assessors as neoconservatives, and argue that my sources reveal only certain neoconservative perspectives. However, instead of discussing ideology, this study treats the office as a channel through which experts from academic, non-governmental institutions influence national-security decision-making at the highest level. The underlying assumption is that examining ONA-related work will help us understand the world views of senior US officials and defence elites or, at least, tell us what interests the Pentagon’s internal think tank and, to some extent, the Defense Department. There is also an assumption that it will tell us what questions they asked at certain points in time and reveal, to a degree, the rationale for the pivot. In any case, if US officials and elites’ views of the security environment and the pivot are to be assessed, ONArelated work appears a good place to begin.Cold War originsAs shown by various high-level strategy and national-security documents, the ONA’s work during the Cold War led to net assessment becoming the United States’ main analytical framework for understanding the global security environment and the competition with the USSR. The White House’s 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States argued thatthe United States must pursue strategies for competition with the Soviets which emphasize our comparative advantages … Competitive strategies are aimed at exploiting our technological advantages in thoughtful and systematic ways to cause the Soviets to compete less efficiently or less effectively in areas of military application. Such strategies seek to make portions of the tremendous Soviet military machine obsolete and force the Soviets to divert resources in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not necessarily threaten our own forces.6Some scholars and former officials argued that the ONA, alongside the Competitive Strategies Initiative created by Marshall, helped to perfect the containment strategy that contributed to the collapse of the USSR.7 As argued by Daniel I. Gouré, vice-president of the Lexington Institute, ‘the competitive strategies approach, particularly as applied by the Reagan administration, did much to set the stage for subsequent events and for the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact’.8The ONA continues to play an influential role in strategic assessment and defence planning. It is responsible for preparing the US defence secretary’s annual report to Congress, which contains a comprehensive net assessment ‘to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries’.9 The ONA’s work on the well-known concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs has influenced strategists in many countries. The office is often involved in drafting and assessing national-security and defence-policy documents.Many former ONA staff have held high-ranking positions at the Pentagon, think tanks, consulting companies, universities or military education centres. Taiwan and India have established their own offices of net assessment and the approach has heavily influenced Australian defence policy. According to Chen Zhou, the main author of four recent Chinese defence white papers, the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science also studies Marshall’s work.10From its inception to around 2000, the ONA went through roughly three phases in assessing the global security environment and identifying potential challenges. Firstly, during the Cold War, it focused on long-term competition with the USSR. Secondly, in the aftermath of the Cold War, it worked to find the right direction for strategic orientation. Finally, from the mid-1990s to around 2000, the office began to fully realise the strategic importance of Asia and assess potential great-power competitors in the region. At the end of this phase, the office concluded that China would be the United States’ main strategic competitor in the next few decades.During the ONA’s first phase of assessment, Asia was treated as a key balance area but regarded as being much less important than Europe. China appeared in its studies only on occasion and, when it did, was viewed in terms of its importance to competition with the USSR.11 In the mid-1980s, the ONA recognised that Asia was becoming more important. Drawing on a 1983 strategic-balance review, Marshall concluded that the United States was in a strong position and the Soviets’ capacity to wage global war was diminishing.12 This allowed the ONA to divert some of its resources to studying future security scenarios, such as the rise of Asia and the development of a multipolar world order. Consequently, in 1985 the office requested that the Science Applications International Corporation begin to study potential strategies and policies for use in such scenarios.13 The main findings of these studies were reflected in The Future Security Environment, a 1988 report by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, led by Marshall and Charles Wolf, Jr, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. This report accurately identified several long-term trends, two of which are still highly relevant to the United States’ current strategic thinking and pivot towards Asia.Firstly, the paper argued that the Soviets were correct in thinking technological development would lead to new forms of military organization and operational concepts that would fundamentally change the nature of warfare. Secondly, Marshall and Wolf predicted that the rapid economic growth of East Asian countries would increase their military spending, shifting the balance of power in a way that could affect US security.14 Although the USSR was still at the centre of ONA studies and US strategic planning at the time, the report noted that a multipolar world order was emerging and Asia was becoming increasingly important. The ONA’s recognition of such changes is also evident in subsequent studies, such as Multipolarity in the Pacific by 2010: A Geopolitical Simulation and An Examination of the Implications of Multi-Polarity in Strategy and Force Structure.15Redefining strategic objectivesAlthough the ONA recognised the emergence of a multipolar world order in the 1980s, it was the great changes caused by the end of the Cold War that led it to drastically reassess prevailing ideas about national interests and strategies. Soon after the collapse of the USSR, net assessors acknowledged that the United States was not directly threatened and no longer had a peer competitor. As a 1994 ONA-sponsored study pointed out, ‘current U.S. statements of objectives and strategy are either overly specific or vague because they are in transition from the well-defined problems of the Cold War to a new, relatively undefined set of problems’.16 According to the 1993–99 US National Security Surveys, ‘a primary characteristic of the Cold War was that it really was very stable … It provided a beacon for orientation. There is no beacon right now.’17The ONA’s search for such a beacon led to the redefined strategic objectives and conception of global security proposed in Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999. Written by, among others, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, later Cheney’s chief of staff, under the supervision of future US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the document discussed the United States’ new position as the world’s only superpower. It also reviewed other nations’ capacity to develop strategic aims and defence postures to challenge this status. The plan clearly defined new strategic objectives as preventing ‘the re-emergence of a new rival for world power’ and addressing ‘sources of regional conflict and instability’ that could unsettle international relations by threatening the interests of the United States or its allies.18Despite its aims, the study neither identified the United States’ regional focus nor its potential rivals. It suggested that the main US objective in Asia was ‘to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon’.19 While it supported European integration, a Europe that excluded the United States was judged to be unacceptable. The study also presented India as a potential regional hegemon, recommending that the United States ‘discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean’.20The ONA worked to identify potential threats and adversaries throughout the early 1990s but there is no evidence that it focused on a specific region or adversary until the middle of the decade. In 1992 Marshall instructed his military assistant Andrew F. Krepinevich to assess other nations’ potential to initiate an RMA. Krepinevich compared the global security environment of the time with that of the early 1920s in the belief that no major enemy had emerged. His report intended to identify the most important actors in the following two decades but concluded that the most capable potential rivals were US allies, who had no strong incentive to compete. (Russia had an incentive to compete but was in no position to do so.)ONA-sponsored studies conducted in the mid-1990s such as Research Design for Asia Force Assessment and Asian Security Challenges: Planning in the Face of Strategic Uncertainties revealed Asia’s enormous strategic and economic significance. Unlike The Future Security Environment, which suggested the region’s relative importance would moderately increase, these studies argued that it would become more important than Europe in subsequent decades. From 1993–98, the ONA conducted various RMA-oriented war games, workshops, roundtables and seminars. East Asia dominated its regional studies. Among the 13 papers the office produced in this period, three focused on China, six on Korean unification and one on wider Asia.21 Asia 2025, which was published in 1999, succinctly explained the reason for this change: ‘most US military assets are in Europe, where there are no foreseeable conflicts threatening vital US interests. The threats are in Asia.’22Peer competitorsThe ONA’s advocacy of a shift of attention from Europe to Asia was based on the assumption that a peer competitor to the United States would eventually emerge from the East.23 Asian Security Challenges envisioned four distinct versions of the future security environment in the region, including a scenario in which ‘the major challenge to U.S. security interests came from the regional hegemonic ambitions of one or more large Asian states: China, Russia, Japan or India.’24During the latter half of the decade, the ONA conducted many in-depth assessments of these countries to identify which was most likely to become a peer competitor. It analysed their strategic objectives, wider aims, willingness to challenge US supremacy and long-term trends in economics, demography and military capability. It also undertook various projects to assess the future balance of power in Asia by comparing Asian countries’ efforts and abilities to create and adapt to new military technologies.25 Marshall was one of the few defence analysts to recognise China’s economic potential in the 1980s: he predicted the country would develop the world’s largest economy in 25–30 years. In 1994 Marshall argued that ‘there may be six or eight major powers, but the two that have the biggest chance of becoming major competitors are a revived Russia that partially reconstructs its empire, and China.’26 Marshall’s net assessors did continue to study other scenarios. This was in line with his oft-repeated lesson to ONA staff: ‘don’t try to make your best guess. Don’t try to say, this is what’s going to happen, I’m pretty sure, and then suppress dissent, suppress other scenarios that might unfold, or imply that you sort of have a know-it-all attitude.’27In the early 1990s, for example, many net assessors judged that Japan’s economic power and technological development made it a promising candidate to initiate a future RMA and challenge the United States. Asian Security Challenges argued thatJapan’s technology, manufacturing capabilities, manpower skills, communications, and transportation nets would enable it to make a major increase in its military capabilities, if it decided to do so and was able to overcome the domestic political barriers to becoming a military power ... Japan has the resources to become the dominant military power in Asia and even to become a global military power.28The 1991 study Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy points out that ‘Asian leaders – notably in Japan – resented the notion that American leaders would arrogate to themselves the right to make decisions and take actions in the name of the greater good of a broadly defined Western world (including the advanced economies of Asia)’.29 However, Japan’s Potential Role in a Military-Technical Revolution, published later that year, concluded that the country showed no interest in re-militarisation: ‘Two strong impressions came out of interviews. First, the pacifist sentiment in Japan was even stronger than we had imagined from our previous readings and experience. Second, tactical-technical innovation is weak and, as far as we could discover, almost non-existent.’30 Moreover, the stagnation of the Japanese economy made it unlikely that Japan would become a peer competitor.During this period, net assessors maintained that Russia’s military capability, notwithstanding formidable weapons systems and advanced technological expertise, was being severely eroded by economic difficulties and a demographic crisis. Moscow’s defence budget was rapidly diminishing; the Russian state had ‘consistently had problems meeting budget commitments due to tax shortfalls’. The country’s negative population growth had reduced its military-age population.31 This demographic crisis was serious enough that, from the mid-1990s, net assessors grew concerned that China might exploit it by populating Russia’s eastern territories or invading Siberia.32 They also argued that Russia’s sophisticated research and development infrastructure would be undercut by long-term economic decline.The ONA identified China rather than India as the United States’ principle adversary for several reasons. Firstly, it seems net assessors could not agree whether India should be considered as a potential niche competitor or peer competitor.33 The key difference between these categories is that niche competitors do not threaten the United States’ vital interests, while peer competitors have the potential to challenge its global dominance. Secondly, even if both countries were considered to be potential peer competitors, China would rise more quickly in the short term. Published in 1996, the ONAsponsored study China and India, 2025: A Comparative Assessment concluded that China had more potential for growth before 2025, but India was likely to become more powerful thereafter.34 One scenario explored in Asia 2025 suggested that the United States needed to establish ‘a working strategic dialogue and common geopolitical objectives with one of them, and India appears to be the more logical choice’.35 In April 2000, Marshall suggested this strategy to Donald Rumsfeld, who would be appointed US defence secretary in January 2001, arguing that the United States needed to ‘get interested in India and Australia, and develop better relationships’.36 Marshall confirmed his support for this approach in a discussion about the creation of an Asian equivalent to NATO with high-level Indian civilian advisers in 2003.37China as the principle competitorThe ONA judged China to be the United States’ main competitor by assessing its capabilities and intentions, which it continues to carefully monitor. A large population with a relatively high literacy rate provides China with the skilled labour necessary for military modernisation and an RMA. The percentage of China’s population at working age will be higher than that of India until 2030, when the trend reverses.38 Marshall started thinking about China as a potential threat to American primacy when its economy, which has been growing rapidly since 1978, was smaller than that of Italy. He suggested that its rapid economic expansion would allow it to increase its military capability and diplomatic influence in Asia and other regions, such as Africa and Latin America.China’s military is larger, and being modernised more quickly, than that of any other Asian country. The Americans feared that its growing anti-access and area-denial capabilities would enable it to coerce its neighbours and gradually displace US influence in the region. In the mid-1990s, China’s economic development allowed it to significantly increase defence spending and modernisation programmes, and to initiate an RMA. Since then, Marshall has commissioned studies on the country’s military development, power-projection capabilities, changes to its operational doctrine, perception of the future security environment, approach to warfare and RMA.39 In the 1994 China in the Near Term, net assessors contended that the 1991 US invasion of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm fundamentally altered Chinese perceptions of future warfare and fuelled the PLA’s modernisation efforts.40 In 2005 the late Mary C. FitzGerald, research fellow at the Hudson Institute, warned that China had moved towards an RMA by developing weaponry and improving its military theory, organisation, education and training.41She argued thatinformation, naval and, above all, aerospace [capabilities] still constitute the nucleus of the new revolution in military affairs. If we neglect the timely development of weaponry in these arenas, then China could catch America like a deer in the proverbial headlights, precisely where we caught them after the 1991 victory in Desert Storm.42During the 1990s, the balance of military power in the Asia-Pacific gradually shifted to benefit China. The collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation considerably eased Sino-Russian territorial disputes and allowed China to focus on other contended areas, such as the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In response to the PLA’s demonstration of force in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States assisted Taiwan by providing it with analytical training through the ONA and helping it to develop its defence capabilities.43In 2000 Marshall argued that ‘the PRC is ambitious. Its goal is to be a great power.’44 Such a view was also evident in China in the Near Term, which concluded that China’s long-term strategic goal was to develop a military that rivalled the United States globally.45 The report argued that China was dissatisfied with the US-dominated world order and its foreign policies were ‘independent of and sometimes opposed to U.S. policies’, which created ‘the potential for China directly to challenge U.S. security interests’.46 The Pentagon-sponsored The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications, published in 1999, used realist theory and an analysis of Chinese history to argue that China would seek to dominate the Asia-Pacific as its power grew.47 As FitzGerald put it in 2005, ‘China’s ultimate objective is to achieve global military-economic dominance by 2050’.48Marshall laid out the blueprint for the pivot in a memo to Rumsfeld in May 2002:Australia: start negotiations to base selected US forces in Australian Northern Territories and expand US and regional states’ use of Australian training ranges … India: increase port visits, and initiate program of mil-to-mil interactions; initiate joint planning for contingency of loss of control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan … Initiate planning for a major expansion of basing infrastructure in Guam, and possible improvement in Pearl Harbor infrastructure … Direct the Services to plan for the types of military challenges a malevolent China may pose over the long-term, and incorporate these into Service and Joint war games, training and exercise programs, including routine wide-area USN–USAF–special forces exercises … For next UCP change , redraw CENTCOM/PACOM boundaries to reflect China as principle long-term strategic competitor.49The memo makes clear that despite China’s comparative lack of development in many areas, the ONA had identified it as the biggest threat to US primacy over the next few decades. As Aaron L. Friedberg, professor at Princeton University, has argued, ‘China today appears to have both the “will” and the “wallet” to compete actively with the United States for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world’.50Preserving US primacy through competition with ChinaNet assessors usually suggest that the United States has three ways to meet the challenges of a rising China.51 It could either forego its current primacy by reducing its global presence and reverting to isolationism, create a multipolar world order in which other great powers take the lead in dealing with problems in their regions or preserve its current position by limiting China’s growing power and influence.52Several ONA studies in the early 2000s addressed the difficulties of preserving or extending US primacy.53 Although net assessors acknowledge that the United States’ relative power will decline in coming decades, they often argue that it can preserve its current role. In the face of challenges from emerging powers, history suggests that a dominant state can preserve or strengthen its primacy. Friedberg has argued that the United States may be able to maintain its position for at least a few decades.54 The 2002 ONA paper Military Advantage in History uses case studies of dominant ancient powers to argue that superior armed forces are vital to the preservation of great power status:The Roman model suggests that it is possible for the United States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop countercapabilities. Transformation coupled with strong strategic institutions is a powerful combination for an adversary to overcome.55The paper therefore suggests that the United States needed to initiate an RMA to adapt to the changing security environment, especially the asymmetric challenges posed by China.Having confirmed that maintaining US primacy was possible, Marshall devised a strategy for competing with China that focused on dissuasion, deterrence and defeat. This approach was officially introduced in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and reiterated in later documents. The strategy accords with Marshall’s view that ‘any adequate balance assessment requires evaluation from at least three perspectives: deterrence, likely war outcomes, and long-term competition in peacetime’.56Dissuasion, deterrence and defeatNet assessors argue that dissuasion is crucial to long-term peacetime competition. Marshall suggests the United States’ strategic goal ‘should be to delay the emergence of hostile and competent competitors’.57 This objective could be achieved by dissuading China from further developing its military or expanding globally. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report proposed thatthrough its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.58Although the concept of dissuasion was only officially introduced in 2001, the ONA has studied the idea for much longer. In 1992 Krepinevich stated ‘there are ways in which the United States could shape the competition, or dissuade or deter competitors’.59 Today, dissuasion and deterrence appear to be very similar. Dissuasion Strategy, a 2008 study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, defined dissuasion as ‘pre-deterrence’ or ‘actions taken to increase the target’s perception of the anticipated costs and/or decrease its perception of the likely benefits from developing, expanding, or transferring a military capability that would be threatening or otherwise undesirable from the US perspective’.60 Stephen P. Rosen, professor at Harvard University, has explained the logic of long-term peaceful competition:By understanding the fears and sensitivities of an adversary, programs could be initiated or reinforced in ways that reduced the confidence of the adversary in his ability to win an engagement or a war. This could enhance deterrence, and also lead the adversary to cease its efforts even to compete with the United States in certain areas.61The United States may dissuade potential competitors by occasionally demonstrating its military capabilities and willingness to enter into a conflict, but dissuasion is a very delicate matter. An excessive demonstration of force and willingness to fight could prompt greater Chinese assertiveness。This suggests that to determine the correct use of the strategy, the Pentagon will closely monitor China’s perception of, and responses to, dissuasive action. The success of such a strategy depends more on the Chinese reaction to dissuasive demonstrations of power than the actual capabilities of US forces. Where China’s view of US military superiority has made it less likely to develop capabilities to challenge the United States, dissuasion has succeeded. This recognition of the importance of perceptions has led to many studies of human cognition, the biological mechanisms of decision-making and Chinese culture, strategic traditions and leadership ideology.62In the last 10–15 years, the ONA has focused on strategic dissuasion. The office views China’s development of capabilities as being in its early stages, but having great potential to challenge US primacy in the long term. The ONA also concludes that, should both dissuasion and deterrence fail, the United States must be prepared to defeat China. The likely outcomes of such a conflict, and whether it would serve US interests in the long term, are unclear. The ONA’s usual method of gathering experts from relevant areas to create a range of plausible scenarios is insufficient for predicting how a war between the United States and China would play out, even in terms of assessing the likelihood of achieving military objectives. Qualitative factors, such as doctrine and operational concepts, are vital to determining the results of such a war. The development of new weapons technologies and operational concepts could serve the strategies of dissuasion, deterrence and defeat because it may enable the United States to prevail in future conflicts and discourage potential adversaries from attacking US interests.63Assessing ChinaSince 2000, the ONA appears to have made significant progress in creating strategies for long-term competition with China. As the office increased its efforts to understand the long-term consequences of China’s rise, it undertook a series of analyses of the country’s economy; military capabilities and modernisation; potential economic and political influence in the region and perception of the security environment.64 The ONA often conducted war games designed to assess how US and Chinese forces might interact, including through the office’s annual summer studies programme at the US Naval War College.During this period, many other US organisations, especially ONArelated think tanks, worked to assess China. Analytical tools developed by the office were often used to simulate Sino-American conflicts.65 In recent years, the ONA has organised many seminars and workshops on net assessment, competitive strategies and case studies focusing on China, including a 2010 conference that produced the book Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice. Such developments suggest the office has accepted the United States will enter into long-term competition with China, and has made the application of Cold War analytical and strategic methods central to its work. It is likely that the ONA seeks to identify China’s strengths and weaknesses, how to best use US power against Chinese vulnerabilities and the forms of competition that most favour the United States. For example, if the office judges that China fears containment, it may formulate strategies to exploit this perception.* * *A study of the ONA’s work suggests that the United States’ pivot towards Asia has been a gradual process. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, the office’s progressive shift of focus from the Soviet Union to competition with China was based on long-term assessments of the security environment and the development of potential emerging powers. It also suggests that the Pentagon began a detailed assessment of Chinese strengths and weaknesses in the early 2000s. In recent years, ONA studies have attempted to outline a strategy to exploit Chinese vulnerabilities and compete in areas in which the United States is strong, with the goal of preserving US primacy. If the office’s work anticipates US strategy in Asia, the United States may demonstrate its power in highly selective ways that aim to dissuade China from challenging its dominance. It is likely that Cold War competitive strategies will be a significant part of the Pentagon’s approach to China in coming decades.Notes

一、为何以长江铁路桥为打击目标几乎被视为国际关系“铁律”的“修昔底德陷阱”认为,一个新崛起的大国必然要挑战现存大国,而现存大国也必然会回应这种威胁,这样战争就变得不可避免。而为应对中国的崛起和军力的增强,美国军方也确实进行了理论上和实践上的准备,最明显的莫过于提出了“空海一体战”的概念,并在该概念指导下进行国防和军队建设。然而,随着研究的深入,“空海一体战”存在的问题与缺陷愈益显露,部分专家、学者开始觉得该概念并不完全适应未来的作战需要,更不用说在一场与处于战略上升期的中国的大规模军事冲突了。这其中一方面有美国综合实力相对下降的原因,另一方面中国和伊朗,尤其是中国在军事技术领域的进步也引发了美军对“空海一体战”概念效能的疑虑。在这种背景下,作为“空海一体战”进一步发展的种种新概念和理论,如“离岸制衡”战略、“离岸控制”战略、新“抵消战略”等,便纷纷出笼。文谷数重在赞同“空海一体战”概念“显得过时”的同时,指出“离岸制衡”、“离岸控制”等战略也存在问题,其均“以美无法确保对华制空权和制海权、无法对中国本土进行打击的判断为前提”,目的在于“抑制、避免与中国发生战争”,却“不是战争爆发后终止战争的办法”。而实际上,“美国不能时常确保在中国沿岸上空的压倒性空中优势,但可以对东海和中国大陆的交通要道实施有限规模的打击”。至于打击目标,文谷数重认为:“应着眼于能让中国战争经济崩溃的目标,且未来美国也有能力通过有限打击予以破坏。这样的目标是唯一的,即横跨长江的铁路桥。”因为“如长江的铁路桥遭到破坏,将切断中国南北经济”,且“与其他有限打击相比,破坏长江铁路桥至少是可能让中国屈服的办法”。二、突击时序选择根据文章提供的数据,中国横跨长江的铁路桥共有15座,其中11座为连接南北铁路网的铁路桥,4座为盲肠铁路线所用的铁路桥。在15座铁路桥中,有8座复线铁路桥,其中4座为干线铁路桥。位于南京的京沪铁路和京沪高速铁路所经2座铁路桥、位于武汉的京广客运铁路和京广铁路所经2座铁路桥是4座干线铁路桥。“这4座铁路桥如遭受破坏,将致使连接南北铁路网的25条铁路中的14条铁路不能通行”,中国南北铁路运输能力将减少4成,因而被文谷数重列为首先打击的目标。第二位打击的目标是3座复线铁路桥,即芜湖的淮南铁路桥、九江的京九铁路桥、宜昌的焦柳铁路桥。文谷数重认为,在上述4座干线铁路桥不能使用的前提下,“这3座铁路桥如遭到破坏,连接南北的25条铁路中的22条将无法通行”,中国南北铁路运输能力将减少9成。第三位打击的目标是重庆的川黔铁路桥、宜宾的内六铁路桥、攀枝花的成昆铁路桥3座单线铁路桥。文谷数重指出:“如果这3座单线铁路桥也遭受破坏,南北铁路网运输能力将完全丧失。”4座连接盲肠铁路线的铁路桥分别是宜昌的宁蓉铁路桥、万州的万州铁路桥、泸州的泸州川铁路桥、宜宾的宜珙铁路桥。这4座桥所在的铁路线为盲肠线,不连接南北铁路网。文谷数重声称,对3座单线铁路桥和4座盲肠线铁路桥打击与否于南北运输能力影响不大;但若着眼最大规模摧毁,除打击15座铁路桥外,还可打击江阴至靖江的渡口、重庆地铁和在建的沪汉蓉快速铁路桥3个目标。三、铁路桥破坏效果文谷数重认为,长江铁路桥是中国运输网的要害,“如果横跨长江的15座铁路桥遭到破坏,中国的铁路网将被完全分割成南北两部分”,中国南北方经济都将受到极大的影响。具体而言,“长江铁路桥一旦遭到破坏,南方地区将丧失1/3的煤炭供给,失去几乎全部的石油供给,南方仅能得到所需能源的1/4,经济事实上将陷入瘫痪。人民生产生活受到严重影响,国民士气低落,继续作战的意志将受到极大影响”;长江以北地区虽不存在资源缺乏困境,但由于来自南方的原材料、器材、半成品、成品等运输被停止或滞留,北方地区将丧失支援南方地区和恢复运输网的能力。“换言之,如果长江铁路桥遭到破坏,中国战时经济崩溃是可以预期的。单靠海上封锁无法制服中国,但打击长江铁路桥将使中国国内经济崩溃,迫使其不可能继续作战。”文谷数重进一步指出,如果在攻击长江铁路桥的同时,还攻击南方地区的煤矿,封锁长江河流运输和南方陆上国境,并且在储藏大量石油的西部地区煽动民族运动等,则“打击效果有望进一步扩大”。四、作战行动构想文谷数重认为,尽管美国对华军事优势已相对弱化,但即便在可预见的未来,“美军空袭长江铁路桥也没有多大困难”,而且,“将攻击长江铁路桥作为制服中国的手段是具有现实意义的”。不过,为了使攻击行动较易得手,应选择“防空网没那么稠密”的地区突防。“具体空袭路线是,经印度尼西亚半岛,通过缅甸、柬埔寨和老挝上空”,从云南进入中国境内,之后,“避开大城市飞行,可能在毫无抵抗下到达长江铁路桥”。至于过境缅甸、柬埔寨和老挝问题,文谷数重强调,这些国家均无力阻止美军通过领空,“可以无视其抗议”。“当然,有必要顾虑区域有实力的印度和越南的反应,并做好应对东盟的准备。”考虑到“美国不能指望印尼提供基地”,东盟各国至今未出现“因仇华而提供基地”的情况,因此,“美军经由此线路实施空袭存在基地和战机续航能力的问题”。解决这一问题,“空袭手段应为巡航导弹、舰载机、战略轰炸机,以及未来的UAV”。文章还设想了美军F/A-18E/F舰载机、B-2战略轰炸机使用“战斧”、JASSM-EX巡航导弹沿指定线路实施攻击以及“战斧”、JASSM-XR巡航导弹从孟加拉湾和泰国湾发射攻击中国长江铁路桥的场景。五、纯属臆测文章通篇论述的是美军应如何攻击长江铁路桥,来“瓦解中国战时经济,击溃持续作战意志”,从而使中国屈服,终止战争,并且对中国而言,“直接防护铁路桥免遭巡航导弹攻击不现实。即使用烟雾和起爆层遮蔽铁路桥、配置防空火力,也无多大效果”。至于战争是怎么爆发的,战场在哪里,战争的性质、规模、强度如何,则只字未提。反倒是在文章的末尾,文谷数重觉得,“美中实际上不会直接对决”,“以前的‘空海一体战’和现今的‘离岸’战略,以及本文提出的攻击长江铁路桥方案,不过是讲述棋谱和着数,并非描述未来的实际状况”。的确,中美既不存在领土之争,也不存在海洋权益之争,故而只要不出现战略形势重大逆转或严重的战略误判,中美爆发大规模军事冲突的可能性微乎其微。况且,正如提出“离岸控制”战略的美国国防大学国家战略研究所高级研究员T·X·哈梅斯所言:“对一个拥有大型核武库的国家取得决定性胜利的想法即使没有完全过时,也风险重重。”“美国不了解中国的核决策过程,因此要采取尽可能降低升级可能性的战略方式”。但另一方面,也应该承认,美军的战争准备意识是浓厚的,战争准备活动是实打实的。二战结束以来,美军一直十分注重作战计划的制定,且每隔一段时间都要根据对手情况的变化及演练中发现的问题对作战计划进行修改、完善,甚至于对于英国这样“铁”的盟友,据说美军亦预有相应的作战计划,只不过“线条”粗一些罢了。因此,对于文谷数重所描绘的场景,中国应“宁可信其有,不可信其无”,并视情采取一定的应对措施。透视《攻击长江铁路桥将中国南北分割》一文,不得不叹服于文谷数重对中国经济地理的熟悉程度及对其要害、关节的把握能力,而日本人的强烈的情报意识也是值得我们借鉴学习的。但辩证地讲,作为对战争行动的推演,文谷数重至少忽略了两点:一是对抗。战争是活力的对抗,《攻击长江铁路桥将中国南北分割》不应仅仅只构想美军对长江铁路桥的攻击,还应考虑中国军队对美军飞机、导弹的层层拦截以及对美军前进基地的破坏、摧毁等;二是中国的智慧。针对中国迅速崛起后,必将与美国这样的旧霸权国家发生冲突的担忧,中国国家主席习近平2014年1月22日在接受《世界邮报》专访时表示,应该努力避免陷入“修昔底德陷阱”,强国只能追求霸权的主张不适用于中国,中国没有实施这种行动的基因。中华民族是爱好和平的民族,中国几千年的文化传统赋予中国人民超凡的智慧与谋略,因此,即便在战争爆发后,中美之间有关是否继续扩大战争还是控制战争规模的决策较量应该也必然会贯穿始终,倚重解放军不断增强的军事实力以及中美双方防止政治经济关系恶化的共同努力,这种决策较量的结果只会是:在崛起、复兴过程中的中国,不可能出现长江铁路桥任人攻击的事件。

本文由新葡亰平台游戏网址发布于澳门新葡亰手机娱乐网址,转载请注明出处:日本军事专家针对中国长江铁路桥的打击行动构

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